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Abstract: 
This paper is intended to provide a detailed game-theoretical analysis of the buyer-vendor coordination problem 
embedded in the price-discount inventory model. Pure and mixed, cooperative and non-cooperative strategies 
are developed. Highlights of the paper include the full characterization of the Pareto optimal set, the 
determination of profit-sharing mechanisms for the cooperative case and the derivation of a set of parameter-
specific non-cooperative mixed strategies. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the main features of 
the model. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents a game-theoretical approach to the analysis of the buyer-vendor coordination problem 
embedded in the price discount model (PDM). The basic PDM, whereby existing purchasing practices may be 
modified in exchange for a discount in the price of the merchandise, is well known in the literature [41] and so 
is the rationale for giving price discounts (e.g. [8], [10]). Spurred by calls for an improved buyer-vendor 
relationship (e.g. [6], [18]), the last few years have witnessed a revival of interest in this problem, in an effort to 
explore tile feasibility of finding coordinated solutions to the PDM. As a result, there exists a large number of 
PDM versions available, to the point where the term PDM is becoming simply a convenient notational 
simplification. Goyal and Gupta [16], Kohli and Park [25] and Joglekar and Tharthare [22] review this 
literature. At issue here is whether market-induced PDM solutions, where rational players acting independently 
of others attempt to optimize their own objectives, are superior to strategies involving some degree of 
coordination among the parties involved. 
 
The process of developing the PDM needed to evaluate these strategies has focused on the objectives of the 
parties and on the assumptions of the PDM itself. The pioneering work of Goyal [12], Monahan [26] and 
Banerjee [2] extended the basic PDM to consider the vendor's, in addition to the buyer's, problem of setting 
pricing and ordering policies, within a cost minimization framework. Subsequent PDM formulations have been 
developed to satisfy a variety of objectives. Included here are the optimization of joint costs (e.g. [2], [12], [19], 
[22]), of joint profits (e.g. [9], [26]) or the interaction between two return on investment (ROI) maximizers (e,g. 
[1]) or two profit maximizers (e.g. [35]) or a profit maximizing vendor and a cost minimizing buyer (e.g, [15], 
[25], [30]). In addition, efforts have been directed towards rendering the various assumptions of the PDM more 
in tune with modern purchasing practices. This has resulted in research on the number of buyers (e,g, [7], [19], 
[20], [26], [35]), on the specification of the vendor's cost (e.g. [41, [27], [19]) and profit (e.g. [3]) functions, on 
the appropriateness of the original lot-for-lot policy assumption (e.g. [1], [15], f21], [22], [27]), on the type of 
discount offered (e.g. [23], [38]) and on the nature of the vendor-buyer relationship (e.g. [7], [25], [35], [38]). 
 
In spite of the numerous studies on the PDM, the fundamental nature of the PDM buyer-seller interaction has 
not been addressed fully. For example, Rubin and Carter [1990] deal only with cost reductions without an 
indication as to possible sharing arrangements. Chakravarti and Martin [7] consider a cost-saving sharing policy 
agreed upon in advance by a single seller and multiple buyers, while retaining many of the assumptions of 
earlier PDM versions. Parlar and Wang [35] consider a fixed margin, linear demand model and thus the buyer's 
demand is not optimally determined as a function of price. Finally, Kohli and Park [25] adapt the profit-sharing 
solutions of Nash [311 Kalai and Smordinsky [24] and Eliashberg [11] to an earlier PDM, with lot-for-lot 
policies and Monahan's [30] assumption of holding costs being unaffected by the discount. 
 
However, without exploring further the nature of the resulting solutions, it is certainly not enough (i) to show 
the existence or lack thereof of a unique solution to a particular version of the PDM; nor (ii) to identify a 
potential negotiating range within which a feasible agreement may evolve; nor even (iii) to define a-priori 
profit-sharing rules, such as passing all the savings to one party (e.g. [27]) or a profit-sharing parameter (e.g. 
[13], [14], [421) where cooperation is possible. What is needed is to capture the complexity of the conflicts and 
possible cooperative forces which may affect the sharing arrangement between the parties (e.g. [32]). For 
example, modern manufacturing practices (e.g. [29]) lean toward longer-term, single-sourcing (or at least very 
few sources), more information sharing, buyer-vendor arrangements. The resulting negotiating experience 
gained from these closer links tend to increase the incentives for cooperative behaviour (e.g. [36]), to the point 
of sometimes producing Nash-equilibrium solutions, even within a freely competitive framework (e.g. [5], 
[32]). 
 
The above discussion suggests game theory as the appropriate vehicle for the analysis of these interaction 
issues. To that effect, this paper derives a whole gamut of game-theoretical solutions to the coordination 
problem, embedded in a generalized PDM, with profits as optimizing objectives. Section 2 sets the stage for the 
analysis by introducing the mathematical formulation of the PDM, by studying the properties of the resulting 
profit functions and by defining the ensuing game. The model considers a one buyer one seller environment, but 
it may also be applicable to a homogeneous set of buyers (e.g. [9], [10], [25], [26], [35]). Sections 3, 4 and 5 
evaluate respectively non-cooperative (pure and mixed strategies) and cooperative pure strategies forms of the 
PDM game. A numerical example is introduced in section 6 to highlight the main features of the solutions. 
Fingly, a Conclusions section completes the paper. Proofs of all Theorems and Lemmas are provided in 
Appendix B. 
 
2. Model Formulation 
This section first describes formally the generalized PDM formulation and then defines the game which results 
from this characterization. 
 
2.1 The Generalized PDM Formulation 
Before proceeding to the development of the model, some notation is needed. The buyer and the seller are 
identified by b and s, respectively. Currently, they are assumed to be operative at a procurement level of Q0* 
units per buyer order. However, the seller is interested in inducing a higher purchasing level by offering a 
discount. If the discount is rejected, the current Q0* order policy remains in force. Let d be the unit discount, 
expressed as a fraction of the item's dollar value. Then, the parameter vector for the buyer consists of the unit 
selling price, pb, the unit purchasing cost, cb(1 - d), the unit profit margin, mb, the holding cost per dollar per 
unit of time, hb, and the ordering cost per order, ab. The corresponding vector for the vendor is denoted by ps(1 - 
d) = cb(1 - d), ms, cs, hs, and as, respectively. The profit margins are defined as 
mb = pb – cb(1 - d) 
        (1) 
ms = cb(1 – d) - cs 
Confronted with the seller's offer of a fixed discount level, d, the buyer purchases in lots of Q units to satisfy a 
constant demand of D units per year (e.g. [25], [26], for the implications of the constant demand assumption). 
As a result, the profit function, πb, is 
πb (Q) = mbD — abD/Q — cb(1 — d) hbQ/2  (2) 
Confronted with orders of Q units, the selling firm must decide on the number of orders, n ≥ 1, of size Q to 
purchase/manufacture, as well as on the discount level, d, it is willing to offer. Note that the n ≥ 1 condition is 
tantamount to dropping the lot-for-lot policy assumption of a few of the earlier PDM versions, in favour of the 
more common formulation adopted by some of the more recent studies cited earlier. The seller's profit function, 
πs, is given by (e.g. [27], [38]) 
πs(d, nQ) = msD — asD/nQ — hscs(n — 1) Q /2 (3) 
Observe that in (2) and (3), Q is unconstrained from above. "This follows from the usual PDM assumption that 
the seller's production rate is essentially infinite. Further, the properties of the profit functions in (2) and (3) 
with respect to the order quantity, Q, may be summarized as follows 
 
Property 1. Properties of the profit functions with respect to the order quantity 
1a. πb*(Q) has a unique maximum at 
Q
*
= √        (   )    (4) 
1b. For n real and a given Q, πs (d, nQ) has a unique maximum at 
n
* 
= Max{ √            Q, 1} (5) 
1c. πs (d, n*Q) is an increasing and linear function of Q. 
 
Note that the seller's decision problem in 1b is somewhat different from the buyer's. The dropping of the lot-for-
lot assumption requires that n be also a decision variable. To substantially simplify the analysis, as in [35], n is 
assumed to be real. Appendix A demonstrates that the n-real assumption represents a good approximation to the 
n integer case. To be feasible, n* in (5) must be at least 1. Whether n* equals one or not has important 
implications in deriving the optimal cooperative-pure-strategy order quantity [see (40) below]. 
 
The results for πs are based on Lee and Rosenblatt [27], For the remainder of the paper, the seller's profit 
function is evaluated at its optimum value of n, as defined by (5). Further, the seller is assumed to have fixed the 
value of d. The two most common reasons for this situation are competitive pressures and lack of authority on 
the part of the seller to modify, for a particular customer, a discount policy developed elsewhere in the 
firm (e.g. [10]). As a result, only the order quantity is negotiable. This assumption is not as restrictive as it 
sounds. Within the range of feasibility, for any order quantity, there exists an optimum discount level. Also, for 
a specific discount level, there corresponds an optimal order quantity. Thus, a simple reparameterization of Q 
on d renders possible the setting of the bargaining problem in terms of d rather than Q. Hence, to simplify 
notation, both n and d are dropped from the characterization of this function. Then, the function πs(d, nQ) may 
now be rewritten simply as πs(Q). Combining (3) and (5), it is evident that 
 
 πs(Q) = msD — √         + hscsQ/2   if n
*
 > 1 
(6) 
          = msD – asD/Q,      if n
*
 = 1 
 
It should also be observed that the expressions for πi, i = b, s, in (3) and (6), implicitly assume a positive 
discount rate. Only when the optimal no-discount order quantity, Q0*, is needed, d = 0 is implied. Finally, the 
yearly demand, D , is considered to be independent of fluctuations in either d or Q. This assumption follows the 
usual practice in the PDM literature referred to earlier. It also concentrates the applicability of the ensuing 
model to relatively high price-inelastic products, for which inventory control, rather than market fluctuations, is 
paramount. 
 
Property 1 justifies the graphical representation of the profit functions of Figures 1 and 2. Without discount, the 
buyer purchases Q0* units, as defined in (4), for a profit of πb*(Q0*). Hence, πb*(Q0*) represents the lower 
profitability limit for the buyer in any negotiation with the seller. At the same time, the corresponding seller's no 
discount profit, πs (Q0*), becomes the vendor's lower bound. In addition, these bounds represent the sectuity 
levels for each party and in turn define the upper (for the buyer) and the lower (for the vendor) quantity limits 
from which bargaining ranges may be constructed. These results are summarized in Property 2 below. 
 
 
Property 2. Bargaining range limits 
2a. The buyer's largest order quantity, QB, is such that 
πb (QB) = πb (  
 )   (7) 
and corresponds to 
QB = [   
  + dD/hb + √(  
  
  
  )
     
  (   )  / (1 – d)  (8) 
2b. The vendor's lowest order quantity, QS, is such that 
πs (QS) = πs(  
 )   (9) 
and corresponds to 
QS =   
  + 2cbdD/hscs   (10) 
2c. Both QB and QS exceed the value of Q0*. 
2d. The bargaining range is the interval of order quantities between QS and QB if QS ≤ QB or the empty set, 
otherwise. 
 
Two observations as to the nature of Property 2 are in order. First, since the expression for QB in (8) is based 
upon the definition of πb in (2), it does not include the widely used approximation of Monahan [30], whereby 
the buyer's holding cost savings, cb dQ/2, are assumed to be negligible. Even though such a simplifying 
assumption is computationally more tractable and provides a very tight lower bound on QB, it does affect the 
existence of a pure cooperative optimal strategy, as shown in the next section. Second, both QB and QS, as 
defined by (8) and (10) respectively, are functions of the discount rate, which in effect links the discount to the 
price break point. This is as it should be. The buyer will not accept any quantity above QB nor will the seller 
accept any quantity below QS. Hence, it is rational to expect that the magnitude of these limits be dependent 
upon, and in fact increasing along with, the size of the discount. 
 
Once the quantity limits, QB and QS, have been computed, the bargaining ranges are readily established, by 
finding the discount values which render (QB - QS) either positive or negative. Table 1 summarizes these 
conditions. The results of the Table form the basis for subsequent derivations of the various buyer-seller 
strategies. But, first, the PDM game must be properly characterized. 
 
2.2 The PDM Game 
The PDM game is a two-person general-sum simultaneous game on a continuous strategy space. As mentioned 
earlier, the two players, buyer and seller, are denoted by b and s. Since the discount Q is fixed, the only strategy 
available to a player is to choose a favourable order quantity. Let qb (qs) be the variable that denotes the strategy 
chosen (i.e. the order quantity proposed) by b(s) respectively. Then, the strategy space, S, is given by the two-
dimensional set of all positive order quantities, i.e. 
S = {( qb, qs) | qb > 0, qs > 0}  (11) 
However, it will be shown that in different versions of the PDM, the set S that needs to be considered is smaller 
than that defined by (11). Hence, there exists a subset of S, heretofore referred to as the Effective Strategy Space 
and denoted by SE, such that any pair of strategies in the set {S|SE} is dominated by at least one pair of strategies 
in SE. 
 
Note that (11) is defined as a function of the order quantity only and thus excludes the discount level as a 
strategic issue for either player. This results from the nature of the PDM considered here, namely a 
simultaneous game, where the seller offers a discount under the condition that the buyer buys more than before 
and where the price discount is not for negotiation. Hence, the only strategy available to both parties is choosing 
the order quantity. As is commonly done in such games, this paper focuses on the two most important solution 
concepts for the PDM game, namely pure and mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. 
 
Let Pi(qb, qs), i = b, s, the payoff to player i, when a set of strategies qb, qs is chosen by b and s, respectively. 
'Then, it is evident that the payoff function for the PDM game is: 
 
 
Note that (12) indicates that the discount offer will only be accepted when the two players choose the exact 
same quantity. Such characterization reflects the fact that both parties have the option of disagreeing at any 
iteration of the game and of proposing a new quantity at the next iteration. As a result, if qb   qs, settling at 
either quantity will leave one party with a perceived loss of potential gain which could have been realized if 
settled at the other quantity. It is this behavioral assumption that justifies the payoff structure of (12). Further, 
the second condition of (12) also implies that if the two players are unable to choose the same quantity, the no-
discount solution prevails. Hence, rejection of the discounted offer does not imply zero purchases. Rather, as 
assumed in section 2.1, it results in orders of size Q0*. Observe also that no enforcement costs are explicitly 
included in the payoff to either player. This is done mainly to simplify notation, since the payoffs can be simply 
defined as net of enforcement costs. 
 
Both cooperative and non-cooperative versions of the PDM game are possible, The difference between them 
lies on whether or not side payments are allowed between the parties. Thus, the solution to a cooperative game 
is defined as the order quantity and the side payment agreed upon by each party, whereas only agreement on the 
order quantity is required for a solution to a non-cooperative game. Two additional variations, pure and mixed 
strategies, are also evaluated. At issue here is whether the strategies are chosen deterministically (pure strategy) 
or according to a probability distribution (mixed strategies), defined on the game's strategy space. Combining 
these two sets of PDM variations yields three possible types of PDM games, namely (i) non-cooperative, pure 
strategy; (ii) non-cooperative, mixed strategy; and (iii) cooperative, pure strategy. The resulting models are 
developed sequentially in the next three sections. The concept of the solution to a particular game is first 
defined in each case and then it is demonstrated how the solution may be obtained. Note that the cooperative-
mixed-strategy model is not being considered, since it can be readily verified that both players will choose the 
cooperative-pure-strategy solution with probability 1. 
 
3. Non Cooperative, Pure Strategies 
The solution to this version of the PDM game (i) is deterministic; (ii) includes no side payments; and (iii) 
corresponds to the order quantity which yields the Nash equilibria. The latter is given by a set of strategies, qb*, 
qs*, such that 
 
 
Theorem 1. Non-Cooperative Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria Order Quantity 
The Nash equilibria, given by a set of strategies qb*, qs*, depends upon the relationship between QB and QS in 
this model. 
 
Case A: If QB < QS, the only Nash Equilibria that exists is qb* = qs* = Q0*. 
 
Case B: If QB ≥ QS, the Nash Equilibria is given by either qb* = qs* = Q0* or any set of strategies within the 
following effective strategy space 
 
 
An intuitive explanation of Theorem 1, case B is based upon Properties la and lc, which show that, within the 
[QS, QB] bargaining range, (i) πb is a decreasing function of Q and hence the buyer's best solution is to buy the 
minimum amount possible, QS; and (ii) πs is an increasing function of Q and thus its optimal strategy tends to 
the largest possible order, QB. Clearly, if QB < QS, the set of feasible quantities within the bargaining range is 
empty, as Figure 2 depicts. Hence, if Case A occurs, the players will choose strategies corresponding to the no 
discount position, i.e. qb* = qs* = Q0*. On the other hand, when QB > QS, it will be optimal for them to choose 
strategies that are in the interval [QS, QB], defined in (14), since they yield no worse payoffs to both players 
than those associated with the no discount alternative. Thus, in Case B, unless some kind of cooperation is 
possible, no unique common order quantity exists, even though any solution within the bargaining set benefits 
both parties. This result is also useful in finding the Nash Equilibrium of the PDM game if mixed strategies are 
allowed, as discussed in the next section. 
4. Non Cooperative, Mixed Strategies 
This section starts by examining the main characteristics of the mixed-strategy non-cooperative PDM game to 
be followed by the derivation of the Nash Equilibrium solution. Its salient feature is the derivation of unique 
non-cooperative equilibrium mixed strategies for a particular family of probability distributions, rather than 
merely proving the existence of such a solution. Given the nature of SE for this version of the game, the Nash 
Equilibrium is trivial to find if Case A occurs, since in that situation SE is a singleton. Hence, the emphasis here 
is on the Effective Strategy Space defined in (14), valid only for Case B, when QB ≥ QS. 
 
4.1 Characteristics of the Non-Cooperative Mixed-Strategy PDM Game 
In this case, it is assumed that the two players choose strategies from the strategy space in accordance with 
probability distributions, to be defined shortly. The mixed strategy PDM game of this section may be called a 
game of agreement, in that it exhibits the following characteristics. 
 
Property 3. Characteristics of the Non-Cooperative Mixed Strategy PDM Game/ 
3a. The buyer and the seller choose from identical sets of allowable quantities, defined by the effective strategy 
space, SE, defined by (14). Hence, the kernel is square. 
 
3b. The payoffs to both players, πb and πs respectively, are continuous functions of the order quantity and 
identify a two-person, general-sum continuous game. 
 
3c. The buyer and the seller select a quantity from SE, in accordance with probability distributions (Fb and Fs) 
and their respective density functions (fb and fs), all of which are assumed to be continuous over the bargaining 
range. 
 
3d. The incremental profits of moving to a new equilibrium quantity are non-zero if both players choose the 
same quantity. 
 
Property 3a follows from the characterization of SE in Theorem 1. The continuity of the payoff functions in 3b 
is a direct result of Property 1. The definition of a mixed strategy is represented by 3c and 3d is based on the 
second condition of (12). As shall be seen shortly, its usefulness lies on the fact that it characterizes a special 
two-person general-sum game, from which Nash solutions can be easily obtained, without resorting to the more 
complex generalized approach of Owen [34]. 
 
4.2 Nash-Equilibrium Non-Cooperative Mixed Strategies 
The expected payoffs to the buyer and seller are given in the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 1: Expected Payoffs to the Buyer and the Seller 
 
For the effective strategy space, SE, defined in (14), the expected payoffs to the buyer and the seller may' be 
expressed as 
 
Hence, using Lemma 1, if a pair of probability distributions, characterized by the density functions fb*(q) and 
fs* (q), defined on the interval [QS, QB] for the buyer and the seller respectively, define a Nash equilibrium, 
then it can be claimed that 
 
 
 
For two-person general-sum games, existence proofs for Nash Equilibrium are well known [33]. However, by 
using Property 3 and Lemma 1, the following theorem provides an explicit mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for 
the PDM game and a characterization of the conditions under which it is unique. 
 
Theorem 2. A Particular Non-Cooperative Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Solution 
2a. A set of non-cooperative equilibrium mixed strategies is defined by the following density functions 
 
where ki is positive, finite and satisfies the condition 
 
2b. The equilibrium expected payoffs are given by  
 
2c. The value of ki yields the following expression 
 
2d. If it is required for any pair of equilibrium strategies to have the property that fi*(Q) > 0, i = b, s, for all Q, 
s.t. QS ≤ Q ≤ QB, then the strategies given by Theorem 2a are unique. 
 
The competitive strategies described in Theorem 2 are characterized by two players (i) defining their probability 
distributions in terms of each other's profit function; (ii) normalizing it; and then (iii) yielding a unique pair of 
equilibrium strategies. Such result is only possible by taking advantage of the characteristics of games of 
agreement listed in Property 3. Further, observe that although the assumption of continuous payoff functions is 
still being made only for ease of computations of (21)-(23), the results of this section straightforwardly extend 
to the more realistic discrete case. Moreover, if desired for the purposes of comparability, a discrete version of 
the PDM game may be constructed, by approximating the continuous set of quantities, with a suitable number 
of discrete values. This reduces the problem to the standard discrete two-person general-sum game. The 
resulting bimatrix game is characterized by a payoff matrix, P, whose typical element, [pij], is defined as 
follows: 
 
It is well known [31] that at least one pair of equilibrium strategies exists for this game. One such pair may be 
computed using Lemke and Howson's [28] complementary pivot algorithm. 
 
5. Cooperative Pure Strategies 
It is obvious from Theorem 1 that no unique pure strategy solution exists without side payments. Hence, some 
form of cooperation is needed. This implies that the cooperative pure strategy solution requires not only the 
determination of an appropriate order quantity, QC*, but also a side payment, α(QC*), that is mutually agreeable 
to the two players. Thus, the main issues in this section are the determination of QC* (section 5.4) and, 
subsequently, the profit-sharing mechanism (section 5,5), For these purposes, it is first required that the relative 
strength of the parties be assessed (section 5.1), the reward structure determined (section 5.2), and the Pareto 
optimal set (POS) fully characterized (section 5.3). In addition, for this section's version of the PDM game, it is 
assumed that (i) the two players negotiate to choose a mutually agreeable strategy; (ii) utility is freely 
transferable, to capture the strength of the players [39]; (iii) agreements about side payments are enforceable; 
and (iv) in being transferred, the side payment preserves its utility [37]. 
 
5.1 Relative Strength of the Parties 
The following definition of "strength" is needed. 
 
Definition 1. A player is said to be the strongest if there is no incentive to move from the no discount position 
without receiving a side payment from the other side. 
 
From the definition of the strongest player given above, it is possible to identify the order quantity set which 
determines the relative strength of each party. Such characterization is useful to identify the POS and, by 
implication, the party having to make the first move if an agreement is to be reached. The next result helps 
elucidate which party is the strongest. 
 
Property 4. Relative Strength between Parties 
4a. The buyer is the strongest player if 
QB ≤ QS ≤ Q    or  (25) 
       QS ≤ QB ≤ Q 
4b. The seller is the strongest player if 
Q ≤ QB ≤ QS    or  (26) 
       Q ≤ QS ≤ QB 
4c. Both parties are better off if 
QS ≤ Q ≤ QB   (27) 
4d. Both parties are worse off if 
QB ≤ Q ≤ QS   (28)  
4e. The cases identified in 4a-4d are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. 
 
The import of Property 4 can be depicted graphically, Consider Figure 1, where QS < QB. As shown in 
Theorem 1, any Q  [QS, QB] represents a Nash equilibrium order quantity without side payment. For any Q 
greater than the upper limit (or lower than the lower limit), the buyer (or the seller) is the strongest player since 
πi Q) < πi (Q0*), i = b (or s). Similarly, in the QB < QS case, neither party has any incentive to move away from 
the no discount option if Q  [QB, QS], whereas, without side payment, the buyer (or the seller) will not move if 
the order quantity exceeds (falls below) QS (or QB). 
 
5.2 The Reward Structure With Side Payments 
Let Lb(Q) [or Gb(Q)] be the loss (or gain) to the buying firm, when it is the strongest (or weakest) player and 
Gs(Q) [or Ls(Q)], the corresponding gain (or loss) to the seller. Then, since the standard for comparison is the 
no-discount purchase of Q0* units or its equivalent, QB or QS units at a particular discount rate, it follows that 
 
Let (i) α(Q) be the proportion of the weaker party's incremental profits (Gb- Ls or Gs - Lb) shared by the stronger 
player; and (ii) Rb(Q) and Rs(Q) be the rewards for the buyer and the vendor, respectively, resulting from the 
reallocation of resources. Further, assume that α(Q), Rb(Q) and Rs(Q) are, along with the profit functions 
defined in (2) and (3), all continuous and twice differentiable. Then, Rb(Q) and Rs(Q) are defined as follows.  
 
Property 5. Reward Structures with Side Payments 
5a. If the buyer is the strongest player, then 
 
5b. If the seller is the strongest player, then 
 
5c. A necessary condition for a negotiated solution to exist is that 
 
The justification for Property 5 is straightforward. The necessary condition in 5c follows from the assumption 
that no rational player is expected to move from the no discount position, unless the discount rewards, [Ri(Q), i 
= b, s], exceed in value their no discount counterparts [πi(Q0*), i = b , s]. Furthermore, when the buyer (or the 
seller) is the strongest player, as in 5a (or 5b), then, by definition of "strongest", πi(Q) < πi(Q0*), i = b or s. 
Thus, agreement is possible only if vendor (or buyer), as the weaker party, is willing to share a proportion, 
α(Q), of the incremental benefits [Gi(Q) - Lj(Q), (i, j) {(s, b) or (b, s)}] of moving to the discount position. 
 
5.3 The Parcto Optimal Set (POS) 
The next step in the search for a cooperative solution is to identify the POS from among the six possible regions 
in Property 4. But first, the POS must be defined.  
 
Definition 2. A quantity, Q, is said to be an element of the Pareto optimal set, if the combined total profit to 
both parties exceeds that of its no-discount counterpart. Formally, 
 
With Definition 2, the identification from Property 4 of the order quantities in the POS is straightforward. It is 
clear that the case defined by Property 4d, where both parties are worse off, can be dropped and that the entire 
[QS, QB] range of 4c, where both sides benefit, belongs to the POS. In the four regions of 4a and 4b, the 
existence of a solution hinges upon whether the gain to the weaker party of moving to a given quantity, Q, 
outside the bargaining range limits defined in Property 2 (i.e. where Q   [QS, QB] or Q   [QB, QS], as the case 
may be) is large enough to offset the corresponding loss suffered by the strongest player. To help elucidate 
these issues, consider the following property, based upon the definitions in (29) of gains and losses to the 
players and of the profit functions in (2) and (6). 
 
Property 6. Indifference Order Quantities 
 
6b. Lb(Q) is an increasing and concave function of Q   Q ≥ QB. 
     Gb(Q) is a decreasing and concave function of Q   Q0* ≤ Q ≤ QB. 
     Ls(Q) is a decreasing and linear function of Q   Q ≤ QS. 
     Gs(Q) is and increasing and linear function of Q   Q ≥ QS. 
 
6c. The indifference order quantity, Qp, such that 
 
and corresponds to one of the roots of the following quadratic equation 
 
Property 6b places the necessary limits on the order quantity to characterize the POS in the regions where one 
of the parties is stronger. Property 6c follows from (29) and provides the indifference order quantities, where 
neither party is weaker or stronger. Any other point within the appropriate regions defined in 6b may be a part 
of the POS. 
 
The next step is to establish the conditions under which a given order quantity belongs to the POS. Table 2 
summarizes the various stages needed to characterize the POS. First, it is helpful to evaluate each of the regions 
of Property 4, in order to determine for which order quantity, if any, each party is the stronger (see Table 2, 
column 1). Second, for each region, the feasibility or lack thereof of Qp is determined. For this purpose, Qp is 
said to be feasible in a given region, if its value is finite and falls within that region. Consequently, as shown in 
the second column of Table 2, in the cases of Property 4a (or 4b) where the buyer (or the seller) is the strongest, 
Qp is feasible if its value exceeds Max(QS, QB) (or is between Q0* and Min(QS, QB)). Finally, on the basis of 
these two stages, the values of Q   POS are identified (see Table 2, column 3). Formally, the following lemma 
characterizes the POS. 
 
Lemma 2. The Pareto optimal set is characterized by the following conditions 
2a. If QS ≤ Q ≤ QB, then any Q ϵ [QS, QB] belongs to the POS. 
2b. If the buyer is stronger and QS ≤ QB, then  
Case 1. If Qp is feasible, any Q ϵ [B, Qp] is an element of the POS. 
Case 2. If Qp is not feasible, any Q ≥ QB belongs to the POS. 
2c. If the buyer is stronger and QB ≤ QS, then  
Case I. If Qp is feasible, any Q > Qp belongs to the POS. 
Case 2. If Qp is not feasible, the POS is empty. 
2d. If the seller is stronger and QS ≤ QB, then  
Case 1. If Qp is feasible, any Q ϵ [Qp, QS] belongs to the POS. 
Case 2. If Qp is not feasible, any Q ϵ [Q0*, QS] is an element of the POS. 
2e. If the seller is stronger and QB ≤ QS, then  
Case 1. If Qp is feasible, any Q ϵ [Q0*, Qp] is an element of the POS, 
Case 2. If Qp is not feasible, the POS is empty. 
 
The POS may now be defined explicitly, in Theorem 3 below, by adroit selection of the regions in Lemma 2, on 
the basis of the relative magnitude of QB and QS and of the feasibility of Qp. 
 
Theorem 3. Cooperative Pure Strategy Pareto Optimal Set 
3a. If QB ≥ QS, then 
 
      where (i) the POS lower limit, LL, equals Qp, if feasible; Q0*, otherwise. 
      (ii) the POS upper limit, UL, equals Qp, if feasible; unbounded, otherwise. 
3b. If QB < QS, then 
 
Note that, in 3a(ii), even if the POS is unbounded, there exists a practical upper limit, defined as the maximum 
stock level available for the discount. 
 
5.4 Optimal Order Quantity 
Once the POS is identified, the next question is to determine the optimal order quantity, QC*, of the cooperative 
pure strategy. QC* is optimal in the sense that, along with the profit sharing mechanism of the next section, it 
represents the solution to the cooperative version of the PDM game. The theorem below characterizes Qc*. 
 
Theorem 4. Cooperative-Pure-Strategy Optimal Order Quantity, QC*. 
4a. QC* is the order quantity which maximizes Gb - Ls (or Gs - Lb), πb + πs and Rb + Rs. 
4b. The value of QC* is given by 
 
with h1 defined by (37) and n*, by (5). 
4c. QC* is the cooperative pure strategy optimal order quantity. 
 
Several implications of interest may be derived from this theorem. First, as expected, (37) suggests that the 
feasibility of QC* is parameter specific, as was the existence of the POS in Theorem 3. Second, Monahan's [30] 
approximation, which consists of ignoring the effect of the discount on the buyer's holding costs, reduces the h1 
> 0 feasibility space and hence, the size of the POS, Third, a smaller POS has also interesting implications for 
other studies. For example, it tightens the feasibility of the pricing scheme proposed by Dada and Srikanth [9] 
and a negative h1, where the seller's holding costs are higher than the buyer's, renders the scheme infeasible. 
Fourth, observe that the value of Qc* in (40) depends upon the values of n* from (5) and h1 in (37) and hence 
upon the interplay between the relative magnitudes of the ordering and the holding costs of both parties, When 
n* > 1 and h1 > 0, and the seller's holding costs are lower than those of the buyer, the standard ordering/holding 
trade-off dictates a finite magnitude for QC*. When n* = 1, the seller has no holding costs [see (3)]. Hence, the 
appropriate value for QC* results from the interplay of the buyer's holding costs vis à vis the sum of the ordering 
costs from both parties. Finally, when n* > 1 and h1 < 0, the seller's holding costs dominate over those of the 
buyer. As a result, it is more beneficial for both parties to have the buyer hold as much stock as possible and 
then share the resulting overall benefits. However as the quantity bought by the buyer increases, the seller's n* - 
1. Thus, the n* = 1 order quantity given by the second expression of (40) is also valid in this case. 
 
5.5 Profit-Sharing Mechanism 
Having discussed that QC* is the optimal order quantity of the cooperative version of the PDM, the next issue 
concerns the determination of the value of α (QC*). It is assumed without loss in generality that 
 
i.e. at the negotiated solution QC*, there is a positive amount of profit that can be shared between the two 
players by means of side payments from the weaker to the stronger party. Hence, the problem of profit sharing 
at the negotiated solution, QC*, can be formulated as follows: there is a net utility of A that is to be shared 
between the two players and the issue of determining α(QC*) is therefore equivalent to the problem of deciding 
the optimal amount of utility to be transferred from the weaker to the stronger party, given the utility function of 
the two players. As a result, any profit-sharing mechanism requires the identification of three factors. These are 
(i) the shape of the utility functions of the players; (ii) their attitude towards risk; and (iii) an allocation scheme 
which reflects each side's relative strength. Three of the best known mechanisms are presented here. They 
include the solutions to the Nash's bargaining problem provided by Nash [31] and Kalai and Smordinsky [24] 
and the allocation scheme of Eliashberg [11]. 
 
Nash's Bargaining Problem 
In terms of the PDM game, consider two players of different strengths, with utility functions U and V, for the 
weaker and the stronger respectively. Their aim is to distribute the incremental return, defined as the difference 
between the joint return, RT(QC*), which comprises the sum of the individual returns as given in Property 5 and 
the joint no-discount optimum profits, πb(Q0*) + πs(Q0*). The allocation scheme is based upon a pair of strength 
factors βU, βV, whereby each utile the weaker party gives to the stronger brings additional βU / βV utiles to the 
stronger side, In addition, the players attitude toward risk is summarized by the set (γU, γS), 0 < γ1 < 1, i = U, V 
of parameters denoting either neutrality or aversion towards risk. Another element of Nash's model needed is 
the assumption that the maximum of the minimum utility each party can get by acting on its own is zero. Then, 
Nash's solution to the PDM game exhibits the following characteristics. 
 
Theorem 5. Nash's Solution to the PDM Game 
5a. The utility functions of the parties are given by 
 
5b. The Pareto optimal frontier is described by 
 
5c. Nash's solution results in  
 
. 
5d. Kalai and Smordinsky's solution results in 
 
 
Eliashberg's Allocation Scheme 
Instead of maximizing the product of the two utilities, expressed on the basis of the entire amount to be shared, 
Eliashberg [111 maximizes the sum of the individual utilities, constrained by the Pareto optimal frontier. The 
form of the individual utility functions determines the type of possible agreements between the players. Hence, 
it is possible to derive a multitude of profit-sharing arrangements given the wide range of multiattribute utility 
functions available in the literature. In fact, Eliashberg's example 1, where the individual utilities are 
exponential in form and independent of the other party's payoff yields the Kalai-Smordinsky solution of 
Theorem 5d above. Similar profit-sharing mechanisms may readily be derived for any other set of individual 
utilities. 
 
6. Numerical Example 
To illustrate the main features of the model, the following example is being used. The basic data consists of 
 
Then, the no-discount optimal policy and the security levels (Property 2) for each party, QB and QS, are given 
by 
 
for a total undiscounted profit of $9,444. Note that the value of the error bound, Δ*, from (A2), at the Q0* = 
1,789 of (47) is below a minuscule 5.53, with an optimal real n* = 1.425. Further, since QS < QB, the graphical 
representation is akin to Figure 1. In addition, any order quantity in between QS and QB represents a feasible 
non-cooperative pure strategy solution (Theorem 1, Case B). 
 
To derive the POS for the cooperative pure strategy, it suffices to note that the indifference order quantity 
(Property 6) is Qp = 15,953,661 units and hence the POS is defined by the following set 
 
The end result is an optimum cooperative pure strategy, defined by (Theorem 4) 
 
for a total combined profit of $10,681. 'This amount exceeds its non-discount counterpart by a total of $1,237 to 
be shared by the buyer and the seller. Observe by comparing the individual profits, that the buyer is the 
strongest player (Definition 1), given the lack of financial incentive to move from the more profitable no-
discount position, unless a side payment is present, As for the sharing arrangement, the Nash (Theorem 5c) and 
Kalai-Smordinsky (Theorem 5d) solutions for two risk 'neutral (γu = γv = 1. Theorem 5a) players of similar 
strengths (βV = βU = 1, Theorem 5b) consists of distributing the said amount on an equal basis, for optimal 
returns of 
 
For the non-cooperative mixed strategy, note that the value of r3 in (21) is negative. Hence, the third expression 
for kb in (20) is needed here. Then, after some tedious computations, the equilibrium expected payoffs 
(Theorem 2) are given by 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has provided a comprehensive set of game theoretical solutions to the price-discount problem, under 
profit maximizing objectives. Cooperative and non-cooperative, pure and mixed strategy solutions have been 
provided. The differences among strategies yield clearly defined managerial choices. Theorem 1 hints at the 
potential difficulties in reaching a decision. If the players' objectives lead them in opposite directions (Case A, 
QB < QS), no feasible non-cooperative solution is possible and the no discounted optimal solution appears to be 
the best strategy. Otherwise, when QS < QB, the profit functions overlap (Case B) and a range of quantities may 
be acceptable to the parties. One way of improving the chances of reaching an agreement is for each player to 
take into consideration the other's profit objectives. As Theorem 2 indicates, this may be done in the non-
cooperative case, by explicitly defining density functions dependent upon the other player' profit function, 
Under these conditions, unique solutions are possible for the QS < QB case. Nevertheless, regardless of its 
nature, a non-cooperative solution never yields a better return to both players than its cooperative counterpart. 
Side payments which take into consideration the risk attitude and the relative strength of both parties will ensure 
that both players benefit from the agreement. 
 
Finally, two main research contributions of this paper are worth highlighting again. The first appears in section 
4 and deals with the derivation of unique non-cooperative equilibrium mixed strategies for a particular family of 
probability distributions. Topics for further analysis in this area include the search for other families of 
probability distributions that may also (i) produce unique non-cooperative equilibrium mixed strategies; and (ii) 
help in identifying a unifying structure, if any, in terms of the distributions themselves and of the various types 
of strategies. The second main research contribution of this paper, from section 5, defines a new way of sharing 
profits, by incorporating into the relative strength of the parties their utility functions as indicators of their 
attitude toward risk. Additional work on this area, specially on the use of bargaining with utility functions is 
also warranted. The study of these and other issues justifies additional research. 
 
Appendix A 
Error Bound by Approximating n ≥ 1 Integer With n ≥ 1 Real 
In this Appendix, justification is provided for making the critical assumption of n real for computational 
purposes only. At issue here is that the game theory methodology for n integer is not tractable mathematically. 
Thus, some sort of an approximation is needed, when developing the cooperative PDM version. Two possible 
approximations are: (i) approximate the integer-n objective function of (3) with its n-continuous counterpart and 
then develop the price discount cooperative model; or (ii) take the theoretically correct n-integer formulation of 
(3), approximate the vendor's profit with the n-real approximation of (6) and then develop the price discount 
cooperative model. Whereas in principle the first approach appears to be a valid approximation, further analysis 
suggests that it is not. It can be easily shown that the πs*(n-continuous) approximation is independent of Q and 
hence invariant to the buyer's ordering policies. Under these circumstances, there is no incentive for the buyer to 
entertain any discount offer. Thus the question of cooperation does not even arise within this context. 
 
The second and preferred approximation allows for cooperative solutions more in tune with the realities of 
today's marketplace. The end result is a practical approximation, which yields near-(n-integer)-optimal solutions 
and is proven below to be quite acceptable, in terms of the error it introduces. Hence, the approach of this paper 
is to produce an n-real optimal solution that overestimates the seller's n-integer optimal profit and then show 
that the overestimation cannot exceed a certain bound, that is a decreasing function of Q. The latter is important, 
since the paper deals with a price-discount model and discounts lead to larger order sizes. 
 
To compute the bound, start by assuming that n is real in (3). Then the slope of the profit function for the seller, 
as a function of n, S(n), may written as 
 
The function in (A1) is clearly a decreasing function of n. Hence, its maximum feasible value, S*, occurs at n = 
1 and may be expressed as 
 
Let [n*] be the largest integer not exceeding real n*. Since the following inequalities hold 
 
Further, if [n*] is the optimal integer, (Al) represents the tightest upper bound on the error. Should [n*] + 1 be 
optimal, (Al) becomes a looser upper bound. In any case, S(n*) in (A4) represents the upper bound on the error, 
which, as stated earlier is maximum at n = 1 and decreases in inverse proportion to the order quantity. 
 
 
Appendix B 
Proofs of Theorems 1-5 and of Lemma 1 
First, it will be shown that qb* = qs* = Q0*, i.e. the no-discoun position is always a Nash Equilibrium. That is 
obvious, because if qb* = qs* = Q0*, then 
 
Now consider Case A, where Q0* < QB ≤ QS. Suppose that the statement is not true. Then,   a q'  Q0* such 
that if qb* = qs* = q' , the following holds 
 
 
If q' ≤ QB (and therefore q' < QS), then Ps(qb*, Q0*) = πs(Q0*) > Ps(qb*, qs*) = πs(q') (since q' < QS) and hence 
qb* = qs* = q' cannot be Nash Equilibrium. Similarly, if q' > QB, then Pb(Q0*, qs*) = πb(Q0*) > Pb(qb*, qs*) = 
πb(q') and so qb* = qs* = q' can again not be Nash Equilibrium. 
 
It now remains to be shown that if Case B occurs, then any set of strategies, qb*, qs*, satisfying QS ≤ qb*, qs* ≤ 
QB yields a Nash Equilibrium. Note that in this case Q0* < QS. Now, choose any q' such that QS ≤ qb* = qs* = 
q' ≤ QB. Then, because QS ≤ q' ≤ QB,  Pb(qb*, qs*) = πb(Q0*) and Ps(qb*, qs*) = πs(q') ≥ πs(Q0*), with strictly 
inequality holding when QS < q' < QB. This immediately proves that qb* = qs* = q' is a Nash Equilibrium. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. From (12)-(14) and Property 3, it follows that the expected payoff to the buyer (seller) is 
given by 
 
Since, by (12), the payoff to the buyer (seller) is πb(Q0*) (πs(Q0*)) unless they both choose the same quantity, 
the expression in (B3) for the expected values reduces to 
 
for i = b, s. Since it can be readily shown that the value of the term in brackets in (B4) equals 1, then (B4) yields 
(15). 
 
Proof of Theorem 2. The condition on ki, i = b, s, in (19) is needed for fi*(Q), i = b, s, to be a density function. 
positivity and finiteness of ki, i = b, s, are a direct consequence of the fact that 
 
Then, combining (15), (18) and (19) results in (20). Furthermore, solving for ki in (19), using the definitions of 
the profit functions given by (2) and (6) and, for the buyer, integration formulas 2.172 and 2.175 of Gradshteyn 
and Ryzhik [17] leads to 2c. 
 
The proof of 2d is by contradiction. Consider an alternate pair of density functions, vi(Q), i = b, s, which are not 
characterized by the functional form of (18)-(23) and denote by Vi(Q), i = b, s, the corresponding cumulative 
probability distributions. It is clear that πb(Q)vs(Q), even if continuous, is not uniform. Now, choose  ̅ , such 
that 
 
Clearly, Δ < 1, by the assumption that vb(Q) > 0   QS ≤ Q ≤ QB. Moreover, it can be readily seen that one can 
always choose another density function, wb(Q) and its associated probability distribution, Wb(Q), with the 
property that 
 
which is impossible, if the pair of strategies, vb and vs, is to yield a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium; hence, 
the contradiction. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 2a is obvious, since, as shown in Figure 1, both parties are better off throughout the 
[QS, QB] range. Lemma 2b (see Figure 1) follows from Property 4a. At Q = QB, it is clear that Lb = 0 < Gs. As 
Q increases, both Lb and Gs increase in value, albeit the latter at a constant rate and the former at an increasing 
rate. Whether or not Lb > Gs is parameter specific and so is the feasibility of Qp. But only when feasibility can 
be established is the POS finite. For Lemma 2c, Figure 2 shows that at Q = QB, there is no possible solution. As 
Q increases, the POS continues to be empty, unless Qp is feasible and hence the smallest element of the open 
POS. In Lemma 2d, as Q → QS, then (see Figure 1) Ls < Gb and the existence of a POS is established. Whether 
the POS covers the entire [Q0*, QS] range is once again parameter specific. What is known is that as Q → Q0* , 
Gb decreases and Ls increases. If at Q0*, Gb(Q0*) > Ls(Q0*), then Gb > Ls throughout the [Q0*, QS] range and 
hence all Q ϵ [Q0*, QS] are elements of the POS. Otherwise, Qp is feasible and renders the point at which the 
gain-loss relationship is reversed, as well as the lower limit of the POS. Finally, for Lemma 2e, it is clear from 
Figure 2 that any Q → QB does not belong to the POS. As Q decreases Gb (or Ls) increases (decreases) in value. 
Again, feasibility of Qp implies that Gb(Q0*) > Ls(Q0*), at which point any Q ϵ [Q0*, Qp] is an element of the 
POS. Otherwise, the non-feasibility of Qp yields an empty POS. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4. For 4a, it follows, from Property 6 and Lemma 2, that the optimal order quantity, QC*, 
maximizes the difference between the weaker party's gain and the corresponding stronger player's loss. Using 
(29), it can be readily shown that QC* also maximizes the sum of the profits, πb + πs and, from (30) and (31), the 
sum of the rewards, Rb + Rs. To prove 4b, it is necessary to consider the two possible values for n* in (5). When 
n* = 1, the seller has no holding costs. Hence, combining (2) and (3), it is readily seen that QC* results from the 
tradeoff between the buyer's costs and the joint ordering costs, to yield the second expression in (40). If n* > 1, 
it follows from the first order conditions that the feasibility and magnitude of QC* hinges upon the differential 
between the buyer's and the seller's holding costs, i.e. upon the sign of h1, as defined in (37). A positive h1 gives 
the first expression in (40). Its negative counterpart suggests that the quantity be unbounded. However, as the 
quantity increases in value, n* moves in the opposite direction. Hence, the quantity upper bound is that 
associated with n* = 1. Finally, for 4c, it suffices to show that any sharing ratio, α1, and its order quantity, Q1, 
yield lower rewards for both the buyer, Rb(α1, QC*), and the seller, Rs(α1, Q1), than the corresponding rewards, 
Rb(α1, QC*) and Rs(α1, QC*), associated with the same sharing ratio, α1, and QC*. Hence, Qc* is the optimal 
quantity for any sharing ratio. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the claim is incorrect and thus that 
there exists some quantity, Q1, such that 
 
Then, it can be readily seen that, regardless of which party is stronger, the use of (30), (31) and (B10) yields 
 
Neither inequality in (B11) is possible according to Theorem 4a, hence the contradiction. 
 
Proof of Theorem 5. 5a is simply a formal representation of the discussion preceding the theorem. It contains 
the total return to be shared by the two parties, RT(QC*), conditioned by each player's attitude towards risk. 5b is 
derived in the usual way. V and U are inversely proportional to each other. The coefficients of this linear 
relationship are computed from the observation that if a party's utility is zero, the other gets the full share. 5c 
follows from Nash's objective of maximizing UV, the product of the two utilities. Finally, 5d is the solution to 
the simultaneous system formed by U = V and to the Pareto frontier equation of 5b. Note that for the 
simplifying case of a one-to-one utility transfer (i.e. βU = βV = 1) and risk neutrality on both sides ( i.e. γu = γv = 
1), the solutions from 5c and 5d to the PDM game are identical. Q.E.D. 
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